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mAbstract
For a long time the number of fishers in Norway has declined. Is the decline the
result of an increasingly difficult situation for Norwegian fishers or can other factors
have had an impact? Or in other words: are fishers pushed out or pulled out of the
fisheries? Our analyses are based on a survey among retired fishers and suggest
several reasons for exit: in addition to structural push and pull factors we also find
reasons that are connected more to change in social and cultural values than
economic value. Our point is that we cannot understand why Norwegian fishers are
leaving the fisheries without taking the broader societal context into consideration.
Our results show that fisheries and marine industry policies for recruitment and
employment will have to take the pull from other industries and the comprehensive
welfare state into consideration.
Keywords: Fisheries change, Modernisation, Welfare systemIntroduction
During the last three decades, the fishing industry in Europe has changed dramatically, and
employment in the fisheries has been declining. Correspondingly, both demographic
patterns and industry patterns on the coasts around the North Atlantic have changed
(Brookfield et al. 2005; Directorate of Fisheries 2000–2010a; EU Fisheries 2011; Hersoug
2005; Standal 2009; Sønvisen et al. 2011). Since community development and fishery
traditionally have been closely connected, fishery policymaking impacts on coastal
development as well (Jentoft 2000).
As in most policy fields, goals may be contradictory in fishery and coastal policy. On
the one hand, the needs to protect resources and to develop economically sustainable
fisheries have made it necessary to reduce the fishing fleet. A good individual vessel
economy is necessary to develop and sustain a well-functioning fishing fleet with decent
working conditions, technology and wages that match the standards in the surrounding
society. In practice, these goals also imply a reduction in the number of vessels and in the
employment in the sector (Johnsen et al. 2009a; Standal 2009). On the other hand, robust
coastal communities have been seen as necessary for recruitment, for legitimate governance
and development of sustainable fisheries (Jentoft 2000; Walsh 2011).
An ever-growing body of research literature documents changes in fishing fleet
structure, management systems, organisation and local community relationships within
the fisheries in the North Atlantic (Hersoug 2005; Johnsen et al. 2009a; Neis et al.2013 Johnsen and Vik; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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as in other fisheries nations around the North Atlantic, the number of people employed
in the fisheries has dropped (Sønvisen et al. 2011). This decline in fisheries employment
has partly been a result of the closure of the fisheries commons and the ensuing struc-
tural policies directed towards adapting capture capacity to the resources (White Paper
nr. 21 (2006–2007)). Thus, the closure may have limited the number of jobs available
in the fisheries and may also have complicated other conditions internal to fishery to
such a degree that people are pushed out.
In Norway, however, the change from open to closed access for commercial fishing is
not complete. The fishing fleet is divided into two main management segments, one
closed and one open. The closed segment consists mainly of vessels from 11 m and up
and is regulated with permits, licences and individual, partly transferable, vessel quotas
(IVQs)1. Entry is limited; normally one has to buy into this segment. The open
segment consists of vessels under 11 m, and in principle, everybody can enter as
long as income from other sources does not exceed a certain limit. It has been
proven feasible to make a decent income in this vessel segment. However, some
boats have experienced recruitment problems, which indicates that jobs as crew
members are available.
For some years, recruitment to the fisheries has been an important issue in the Norwegian
fisheries discourse. Clearly, a sustainable recruitment policy for the fisheries requires a solid
insight into why people leave the fisheries and subsequently also leave coastal communities.
However, exit from the fisheries is not a straightforward issue. This paper is an attempt to
shed light on it. Our starting point is that there can be several reasons behind a decision to
leave the fisheries. Exit can be seen as being caused by push factors related to fisheries
closure and working conditions, but most likely, though, in combination with pull factors, it
is related to, for example, opportunities in other sectors, such as the oil supply industry,
public sector and others.
Push and pull factors can be seen as having a relational character, where a decision
about exit can be the result of a mixture of structural factors, expectations and social
mechanisms (Otterstad and Hamilton 1998). Our aim in this article is to explore
the relationship between push and pull and to identify some of the factors driving
a decision to quit.
Our analyses explore several reasons for leaving. In addition to structural factors we
also find reasons that are related to changes in social and cultural values. The
reasons that ex- fishers give for leaving their jobs point towards a pattern of adap-
tation to lifestyles in a modern welfare society. Consequently, as we discuss in the
last part of this article, the fishing sector needs to take this perspective into consideration
in recruitment and employment issues.
In the next two sections of this article, we present our theoretical and methodological
framework. In section four, we describe the changes in the fishing fleet in Norway over
the last 30 years that form the main background for the push hypothesis. In our fifth
section, we present our results and findings and how they can be interpreted in relation
to each other and to other factors. In section six, we discuss the findings and interpre-
tations in relation to the specific pattern we have described in section three. Finally, in
section seven, we point toward some future implications for employment policymaking
in the fisheries.
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In this article, we apply a relational approach, where human action and decisions are
shaped and structured by material, structural and symbolic relationships (Latour 2005).
While on the one hand we acknowledge that this structuring and shaping is not
deterministic, in the sense that it is the individual actors that in the end make
choices inside an environment, on the other we accept that forces in the environ-
ment can have a strong impact. For example, several studies have described how
changes in fisheries technology have contributed strongly to a wide range of rela-
tional changes in the fisheries, in terms of changing practices in the fisheries, of
perception of resources and man-nature relationships and adaptation to rules and
regulations (Caddy and Cochrane 2001; Johnsen 2005; Johnsen et al. 2009a; Standal
2003; Standal and Aarset 2002). Our approach is a development of the concept of the
Fisheries Employment System (FES) (Jentoft and Wadel 1984; Terkla et al. 1988). The
point of departure for the FES theory was that many elements in fishing communities
were woven together. Up to the 1970s, the people in coastal communities were seen as
heavily dependent upon each other. Households depended upon the fishing fleet and the
fishing industry for employment. The fishing industry and fleet depended upon the house-
holds and a flexible school system for seasonal labour. The fishing fleet depended upon
the local communities and local industries for all kinds of services. With little focus on
inequalities and domination (see Neis 1999), the FES theory can in retrospect be criticised
for overemphasis on dependency, close relationships and harmony (Sønvisen et al. 2011;
Vik et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the theory captures important coordination aspects of the
coastal culture. Recruitment and employment in the fisheries were, for example, to a large
extent based on socialisation, and through socialisation fishing became more of a “way of
life” than just a profession (Terkla et al. 1988). The fishers, and their families as well,
became attached to the fisheries as a way of life and the fisheries households and communi-
ties in Norway and around the North Atlantic became socially organised in relation to this
way of life. Moreover, everyday life in the households became structured by the need of the
fishers to adapt their activities to the changing and fluctuating natural and physical environ-
ment they worked in, because the welfare level was dependent on both the availability of
natural resources and the changing and fluctuating export markets (Gerrard 1983;
McGoodwin 1990; Neis 1999). If other job opportunities were lacking, individuals had few
possibilities to choose alternative ways of life.
Consequently, the FES represented a distinctive cultural and empirical setting
that could be impacted upon by material and cultural changes in a wider societal
context (Johnsen 2005; Johnsen et al. 2009a; Johnsen et al. 2009b). As described by
Sønvisen et al. (2011), the local Norwegian fisheries employment systems today
seem to have changed from local community networks to more sector-connected
and professional networks transgressing local boundaries, with consequences for
recruitment processes in terms of potential recruits, knowledge and value forma-
tion. Terkla et al. (1988) documented in their studies from New England that in
kinship-based fisheries employment systems people are more likely to remain
underemployed for longer periods before they seek alternative employment. This is
seen as a result of the strong attachment to fishing as a way of life. Value reorien-
tation, triggered by push and/or pull factors, can weaken the attachment and result
in a decision to leave.
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concepts have their origin in demography and migration studies and can be found as a
hypothesis to be tested (Efstraglou-Todoulou 1990; Fuguit 1959; Otterstad and
Hamilton 1998), more than as a theoretical framework. The idea, however, is that
migration in and out from a region or a sector is caused by structural or socioeconomic
imbalances that push and pull people out of a sector or a region (Fuguit 1959). Push
factors are stressors that push people out of a certain sector and, either by force or as a
result of non-discretionary decisions, where people have no choice (Stimson and
McCrea 2004). For example, entry barriers, reduction in number of positions as a
consequence of regulations or increased efficiency, loss of jobs, more formal and
stricter requirements for participation, harder work conditions, declining economy or
deteriorating work environment are stressors inside the fisheries that actually can force
people out. However, push is not always caused by force: for example, the perception
that the general income level over time cannot compete with a regular job on land can
be seen as an internal stressor that can trigger a discretionary decision about volunta-
rily exit. Such stressors or push factors are related to growing dissatisfaction with the
job or the perception that the conditions inside the sector have become worse and can
lead to a wish for change in work or lifestyle. To sum up, the internal stressors that
cause a push can be of a material, legal, political or economic character such as, for
example, quota cuts, fleet-downsizing decisions, reduced income or increased interest
rates. Increased interest rates may influence the need for higher income for the vessel
owner and can lead to decisions about reducing the size of the crew, which may lead to
a reduction in employment. In addition to these structural stressors, push factors can
be of a cognitive or perceptive character related to the fishers’ perceptions of the daily
work experience, the feeling of attachment to the job and comfort and satisfaction in
the job. In the public debate in Norway, the closure of the fisheries has wrongly been
seen as a push factor. Closure can undoubtedly be a step in a downsizing process, but
does not necessarily contribute to a push. As a matter of fact, a closure of a fishery is a
restriction on access that can actually make it more attractive to remain in the fishery
and as such reduce push and pull factors. But once one has exited, a closure will also
make a return more difficult. Therefore, an exit decision will be more definitive in a
closed fishery, and consequently a closure makes the employment system less flexible
in terms of migration of labour in and out of a fishery.
Pull factors, on the other hand, are not related to thresholds, barriers or structural or
perceptive factors inside the sector, but can be seen as attractors on the outside that
pull people out, like education or job opportunities, higher wages, better or improved
work conditions, more leisure time or time with the family. Although many of the
attractors can be of a structural character, they do not pull people out of the fisheries
by force. Moreover, while push factors can have both a non-discretionary and a discre-
tionary character, pull factors are basically of the latter type in the sense that a volun-
tarily decision about leaving has to be made (Stimson and McCrea 2004). As previously
mentioned, a value reorientation following changes in work condition, life standards
and lifestyles, education or general development in the society can be seen as a
contributor to pull. Hence, push and pull are not only about material, economic and
structural differences in regions and sectors, but can also capture migration caused by
what we can call differences in social and cultural capital2. The perceptive factors can
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push and pull actually work together; stressors in the fisheries may strengthen
attractors outside and vice versa.
From this theoretical starting point, it follows that the relationship between exit from
the fisheries and push factors and pull factors cannot be taken for granted but have to be
established empirically. In particular, it is of interest to explore the relationships and
correspondence between the structural push and pull factors and the perceptive factors.Methodology, methods and data
Methodologically, this study applies a mixed approach. We have combined quantitative
and qualitative methods (Grønmo 1996; Holme and Solvang 1986; Holter 1996). The
methods are complementary, and we aim to maximise the mutual benefits from quanti-
tative and qualitative insights in the article. Our approach is basically exploratory and
inductive and our aim is chiefly to point to possible causes and mechanisms, not to
perform conclusive hypothesis testing. The exploratory and inductive approach follows
from the fact that no quantitative data about fishers’ careers and job satisfaction existed
prior to our survey. Thus, our aim has been to collect reliable data and to explore patterns
in the material. Subsequently, we use a deductive approach to elaborate on theoretical
and empirical expectations concerning what makes fishers leave the industry.
When developing the questions for the survey, we have so to say pre-coded the world
into specific categories. The categories have been developed through a qualitative
analysis of the Norwegian fisheries recruitment and employment discourse. Inspired by
Foucault (Foucault 1991, 1970), we define the fisheries recruitment and employment
discourse as a set of statements, arguments and practical projects related to fisheries
employment and presented either in the research literature, in the political documents
or in the project reports we have used. We have used several sources. First, we have
drawn on official documents from the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs. We
have in particular made use of the four central generic policy documents from the
period 1977 to 2005 (which was most recent) and the official report that forms the
foundation for the Marine Resources Act from 2008 (Parliament Proposal [Ot.prp.] nr.
20 2007–2008); White Paper (St.meld.) nr. 18 (1977–78); White Paper (St.meld.) nr. 19
(2004–2005); White Paper (St.meld.) nr. 51 (1997–98); White Paper (St.meld.) nr. 93
(1982–83)). Second, we have studied research literature and project reports addressing
recruitment and employment issues (see e.g. Johnsen 2004). Third, we also draw on a
wide range of materials and formal and informal interviews with people in or affiliated
with the fishing fleet during the period from 1996 to 2007 (see, for example, Johnsen
2004, 2005; Johnsen et al. 2009a; Johnsen et al. 2009b; Johnsen and Vik 2008). Finally,
we have used information from the annual profitability survey in the fishing fleet from
the Fisheries Directorate in Norway (Directorate of Fisheries 2000–2010b). Although
some of this material is anecdotal, it is part of a discourse about this subject that we as
researchers have participated in3.
It should be noted, though, that although our story is about the Norwegian fisheries,
this discourse is not limited to Norway. Obviously, stocks, management policies etc. are
international by nature. Furthermore, concepts, understanding and frames of reference
that are part of the Norwegian discourse sometimes have their origin in descriptions
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the employment system theory inspired by both Berger and Luckman’s (1991, 1967) general
theory and by empirical studies of local interdependence and relations in Newfoundland
fisheries (Anderson and Wadel 1972a, 1972b; see also Sønvisen et al. 2011).
Through analyses of the material described above, we have identified statements and
arguments about why people either leave or do not want to enter the fisheries. From
the statements we have developed the questionnaire. The quantitative material was
collected through a telephone survey among former fishers. The sample of 200 ex-fishers
was drawn from the official register (Fiskarmanntallet) in the Directorate of Fisheries. The
material covered the intense downsizing and restructuring period from 1990 to 2005. To
identify fishers who had left, we selected five cohorts of fishers: 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003
and 2005. By cohort here we mean fishers with a shared first year of registration as a
fisher regardless of age. By comparing the Directorate of Fisheries’ official register for
these years with the register for 2007, we identified 586 fishers of different ages out of
4,523 fishers in total who registered for the first time in one of these years but are no
longer active fishers. Two hundred out of these 586 were randomly picked for the survey.
A professional opinion bureau, Norfakta Markedsanalyse (NM), carried out the telephone
survey. The data were analysed by use of SPSS.Validity, reliability and generalisation
The quantitative study of fishermen exit is the first of its type carried out in Norway.
Therefore, we have no similar studies to compare it with. However, we do see implications
from the findings from our analyses of the recruitment discourses and the findings from
the quantitative study together. This enhances reliability. Also, comparing findings from
the different periods/cohorts gives indications as to the reliability of our findings. There is
no reason to believe that the answers from the former fishers in the chosen cohorts should
differ significantly from those of the others who left these cohorts in the same period.
However, the 200 randomly picked individuals that make up our sample in the quantita-
tive study represent less than 5% of the total number of 4,523 fishers registered in these
years. We do not know how many of these 4,523 actually left and whether our 200 indivi-
duals are representative of those who left. The results therefore reflect the reasons given by
those who left and cannot be used to draw general conclusions about general perceptions
or opinions among the fishers who have remained in the fisheries.Push and pull from local employment systems to cybernetic fish harvest machines
A comprehensive research literature4 over a period of 40 years portrays fishing as the last
remains of a traditional organisation in coastal communities (Anderson and Wadel 1972b;
Apostle et al. 2002; Barth 1972; Brox et al. 2006; Dalseng 1980; Gerrard 1983, 1993, 2008;
Jentoft 1993; McGoodwin 1990; Neis 1999). The households’ dependency on fishing,
however, was reduced through the 1970s and 1980s with the expansion of the welfare state,
and the public and service sector, which created new job opportunities for women5.
The research literature has also described a radical shift in organisational relationships
in the fisheries from a traditional organic type toward what we can call more cybernetic
relationships (Gerrard 2008; Sønvisen et al. 2011). The characteristics of the organic rela-
tionships are that they were all based on a high degree of social commitment, implicit
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tion, experience and practical knowledge. These relationships tied fishers to a larger, com-
plex but local network. The cybernetic relationships are more formal, organised with
formal feedback mechanisms and explicit control and surveillance mechanisms (Johnsen
et al. 2009b). The changes from the organic to the cybernetic organised fishery imply an
evolving harvest machinery (Johnsen 2005; Johnsen et al. 2009a; Johnsen et al. 2009b),
consisting of a strong relationship between vessels, markets, the processing industry and
more. A visible result is the increased technological sophistication of the fishing vessels
and increased catch efficiency (Figure 1). In this machinery, the “fisher” can have different
properties. There are fundamental differences between a deckhand without individual
fishing rights on board a trawler and the skipper, between the crew and the vessel and
quota owner and a single boat owner and fisher without crew. Their roles and social
statuses as “fishers” are quite different, depending on the relations that constitute them,
although they all are registered as “fishers” in the Directorate of Fisheries’ official register
(Fiskarmanntallet) (Johnsen 2004, 2005). This network transformation has probably
impacted on how fishers perceive their job and their alternatives.
The increased efficiency is reflected in a decline in the number of active vessels and
fishers on the one hand and increased catch per fisher on the other6. The reduction in
the number of people and vessels is partly a consequence of the shift in the Norwegian
fisheries regime from open- to closed-access fisheries, whose cause is driven by an idea
that open access will cause ruin to all (Hardin 1968). This came as a response to stock
collapses, first in the herring fishery in the late 1960s and then in the cod fishery in the
late 1980s. Closed access to the herring fishery was introduced in 1973, while closed
access was introduced in the cod fishery in 1990. Both followed after increased capture
pressure, partly because of new technology. Several fishing nations around the North
Atlantic experienced the same, and, internationally, a continuously increasing capture
pressure was the rationale behind the processes that culminated in the UN Law of the
Sea. Thus, in Norway, as well as in other countries, in an attempt to reduce the capture
capacity, the fishing policies were directed toward reducing the number of vessels and
people directly involved in fisheries (Apostle et al. 2002; Caddy and Cochrane 2001;
Hersoug 2005; Holm 2001).
Parallel to the closure, the direct price subsidies to the Norwegian fishing fleet that
peaked in 1992 were gradually reduced to zero. However, due to a reduced number ofFigure 1 The work deck on a modern fishing vessel. Photo: Jahn Petter Johnsen, 2009.
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2004; White Paper (St. meld.) nr. 21 (2006–2007)) (Table 1). Moreover, the vessels, par-
ticularly in the closed group in the coastal fisheries, became even more technologically
advanced (Figure 1). Modern fishing vessels are in fact effective “fish harvest machines”.
Technological development reduces the need for crew and may have contributed to a
push effect. These changes toward a more cybernetically organised fishing fleet
(Johnsen et al. 2009b) are often seen as stressors that push or force fishers out of the
fleet. It remains unclear, though, how – and whether – these changes link to individ-
uals’ choices of leaving or (not) entering the fishing fleet. Up to 1990, when many boat
owners and fishers struggled economically (Jentoft 1993) and the operating margins in
the fleet were negative, people may have left the fisheries because of the economic
conditions. Since 1990, after the more comprehensive closure of the capture sector, the
increasingly more sophisticated fish harvest machines have steadily increased their
operating margins (Table 1).
These results from the economic surveys undertaken by the Directorate of Fisheries
correspond to findings from research about the physical and social changes in the fish-
ing fleet that indicate that the economic and social labour situation for the fishers has
improved since 1980. The technical development has, for example, reduced the physical
workload to some extent, and research indicates that the profession has become both
safer and healthier (Geving et al. 2008; Aasjord 2011). This substantially counters the
image created by some media discourses of the difficulties in the fisheries. In our
material, on the other hand, we see few signs of a bad situation. Compared to the early
1980s, the Norwegian fishing fleet of today is technologically advanced and profitable,
with a high wage-paying ability (Directorate of Fisheries 2000–2010b; Johnsen et al.
2009a). Better economy and improved labour conditions suggest that push factors
alone are insufficient in accounting for fishery exit.
As previously mentioned, employment in fishing can be expected to be affected by
better employment opportunities outside the fisheries, so-called pull effects. With the
evolvement of the new welfare state in Norway and a restructuring of both the fishing
and processing industries, the economic foundation for households and communities
have changed dramatically in coastal Norway since the 1980s (Statistics Norway 2009).
From the mid-1980s until today, all economic sectors or rural or coastal communities in
Norway have been affected by the welfare state expansion, in particular the expansion of
the local labour markets. However, the FES seemed to have been quite robust, since the
work organisation in the fishing fleet remained rather unaffected by the evolving welfare
state up to 1990, but after 1990 the FES changed in a parallel manner with the reduction
of the subsidies and downsizing of the fishing fleet.Table 1 Operating revenue and operating margin in the Norwegian fishing fleet
1980–2010
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Operating revenue 6,256 −14,240 −59,574 305,178 294,416 941,682 1,206,700
Operating margin (%) 0.8 −1.3 −4.3 11.6 7.9 14.9 16.4
Operating revenues = Operating result – Operating costs.
Operating margin = (Operating result/Operating revenues) x 100).
(Source:http://www.fiskeridir.no/statistikk/fiskeri/loennsomhetsundersoekelse-for-fiskeflaaten/tidsserier-bedriftsokonomisk
(Time series from the annual economic survey for the Norwegian fishing fleet, accessed 20. September 2012).
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resulted in over 90% of young people between 16 and 18 years old continuing their educa-
tion after primary school, and with an increasing level of participation in higher education
as well (Heggen et al. 2001; Johnsen 2004; Statistics Norway 2010). To some extent, the
school system seems to educate the youth away from an insecure future in the fisheries. In
other words, it contributes to the pull away from the fisheries. As a result, fewer members
of the coastal communities are directly involved in the fisheries, fewer members of the
community engage in fishing, and fewer members of the community are recruited into the
fisheries (Gerrard 2008; Johnsen 2004). Hence, social relations in the fisheries and the
community may change as fewer members of the community engage in the fisheries.
Push or pull? Scholars hold that fisheries in Norway and other North Atlantic fisher-
ies nations have become increasingly disembedded from family life, local structures,
practices and institutions. The disembedding is partly a consequence of modernising
processes in the fleet and the development of resource management that has reduced
the need for manpower in the fleet (Apostle et al. 2002; Gerrard 2008; Jentoft 1993;
McCay 1999; Neis et al. 2005; Otterstad and Hamilton 1998; Sinclair 2002; Sinclair
et al. 1999). A part of this disembedding is reflected in the fact that the crew and owner
relations in the fisheries system have become more formalised and thereby now resem-
ble the relationships that we find in the ordinary labour market more7. Furthermore,
the disembedding has the consequence that the threads in the net between fishers and
local communities are worn thinner, and thus both push and pull may become stronger.
In the next section we present our findings for why fishers leave the fisheries.Why do fishers leave the fisheries?
The previous chapter has described some key elements in the changing fishery sector and
the fishers’ networks. This is clearly related to recruitment issues. Recruitment to fisheries is
a wide and highly politicised discourse that is treated in depth elsewhere (for example,
Sønvisen et al. 2011; Sønvisen 2013.). Here we will concentrate on the downside of this
recruitment: exit decisions. Surely, the reasons behind exit decisions may also be reasons
for not entering, and, therefore, they also have value for a recruitment policy. In the
following, we present and analyse what the fishers themselves hold as their reasons to
quit. Thereafter, we discuss the consequences of our empirical findings.
The discourse on fishery downsizing, closure and recruitment has normally been
directed, as previously described, toward issues internal to fisheries and focused on push
factors. The strongest type of push is forced exit: when people are forced to leave their
jobs. Table 2 reports the findings on how the fishers left their jobs.
We see from Table 2 that as many as 81.5% say that they quit on their own initiative. This
includes those who resigned due to age. Further, 4% were fired, 6% were given disability
benefits, 4.5% quit because the boat was sold, and 3.5% reported other reasons. Obviously,
the fact that 81.5% of the fishers reported that they resigned themselves implies that they
were not forced out of the fisheries in the direct meaning of the world. Even the percentage
of people who answered that they had to leave the fisheries when the boat was sold was
low. On the other hand, we do not know whether those who chose to quit had much of a
choice or whether they left before they could be fired or had to sell the boat (in the case of
boat owners). The answers in Table 3 indicate that even if few left as a direct consequence
Table 2 How the fishers left their jobs
How did you quit as a fisher? Percentage
I resigned myself. 81.5
I was given notice (was fired). 4.0
I was given disability benefits. 6.0
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Table 3 presents the push-related factors that former fishers have mentioned as reasons to
leave the fisheries.
In the table, the factors are ranked in descending order. The single factor that is most
commonly mentioned is that the boat was sold; 20.5% of respondents mentioned this
as a reason for quitting. This is a somewhat unsatisfactory answer because we would
like to know why the boat was sold in the first place. And, for those affected by such a
sale, we would like to know why they did not find a job on another boat. However, for
the individual crew member on the boat, the sale of the fishing vessel out of a commu-
nity may very well be – and is indeed – the decisive factor behind fishery exit. The
second and third most common reasons cited were injuries and sickness resulting from
the fishing activity (16%) or from other reasons (14%). These factors point to a much
debated fisheries problem: it is a hard job with risks far higher than most jobs on shore,
and it is a job that requires good physical health. Here we see that a classical push
factor is highly relevant for a substantial portion of fishery exits.
After the factors of illness and injury comes dissatisfaction with the economic outcomes
in terms of salaries and/or unpredictable incomes. Nine per cent held that, for them,
economic conditions were the reason to quit. As we see it, this is a relatively small amount.
The small importance of this reason is consistent with the rather positive development of
economic results in Norwegian fisheries (See Table 1 above).
Next, we see that 7% answered that they lacked the necessary certificates. As
mentioned, the technological and organisational development in the Norwegian fishing
fleet is going toward more cybernetically organised fisheries with vessels that are effective
fish harvest machines. Part of this development is an increasing formalisation andTable 3 Push factors
Reasons to quit (categorised as push) Mentioned by (Percentage)
The boat I worked on was sold. 20.5
I was injured while fishing and couldn’t continue. 16.0
I was injured/ill for other reasons and couldn’t continue. 14.0
The income was bad and/or unpredictable. 9.0
I didn’t have the necessary certificates. 7.0
I wanted more free time. 4.5
The working conditions on the boat were bad. 2.5
I felt my future was insecure as a fisher. 2.5
I wanted more regular working hours. 2.5
Johnsen and Vik Maritime Studies 2013, 12:4 Page 11 of 20
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/12/1/4standardisation of work processes and procedures. The requirements for formal training
and certificates have also increased. In the Norwegian fishery discourse, the increasing
level of formal and standardized requirements for education and/or certificates is much
debated. Especially for older fishers and fishers on smaller vessels, it may be a problem to
keep up with this increasing formalisation –in terms of both knowledge and economy.
Knowledge requirements, formal requirements and economy can be seen as factors that
to some extent force people out. The last answers on the list are related to working hours,
leisure time and insecurity about the future. These reasons are not commonly reported
and can also be seen as a factor in between push and pull factors – they can hardly be
viewed as anything but relative to the pull from an on-shore lifestyle. We will come back
to this relationship later.
Also here we see that many of the push factors are probably important because they
work in concert with expectations of another lifestyle and the conditions in jobs on
shore – the pull factors. Let us therefore take a look at the pull factors. Reasons to leave
fisheries that are not directly related to the conditions within fisheries may be seen as
pull factors. These factors are presented in Table 4.
The most important pull factor in our material is that the fishers wanted to obtain
more education. 42% of the respondents, mainly younger fishers, reported this as a rea-
son to leave fishery. The correlation between age and this exit reason is clear (Pearson’s
correlation −0.281) and significant (at the 0.001 level). For other fishers who quit, the
competition from jobs in other sectors was the key reason: 28% were offered a job in
other marine activities; 16% were offered a job in the petroleum industry; and 10% were
offered a job on shore. Finally, 9% left fishery for family reasons.
An interesting follow-up question here would be whether these reasons to quit are
related to developments in the wider society, for example the growth in the petroleum
industry and the expansion in the welfare state. We may address this to some degree by
looking at the correlation between the reasons to quit and the cohorts we have selected.
Here we found significant correlations for three of the reasons to quit. The findings are
presented in Table 5.
The numbers in Table 5 indicate that there may be a relationship between the most
important period in the downsizing of Norwegian fisheries and the build-up of the
offshore petroleum industry. The substantial increase in employment in the oil and gas
industry in the early 1990s (Statistics Norway 2011) corresponds with the significant effect
of the variable “I was offered a job in the offshore/petroleum industry” for the 1993
cohort. Furthermore, we see that most of the effect of the growth in the on-shore jobTable 4 Pull factors
Reasons to quit (categorised as pull factors) Mentioned by (Percentage)
I wanted to obtain more education. 42.0
I was offered a job in other maritime activities. 28.0
I was offered a job in the offshore/petroleum industry. 16.5
I was offered a job on shore. 10.0
I quit for family reasons. 9.0
I was offered a job in another country. 6.0
I wanted to try something new. 2.0
I started military service. 2.0
Table 5 Reasons to leave and cohort
Year reasons to quit 1988 1993 1998 2003 2005 Sig (2-sided)
I was offered a job in the offshore/petroleum industry. 14.9 39.3 8.6 15.4 13.3 0.009
I was offered a job on shore. 21.3 10.7 6.9 3.8 6.7 0.047
I wanted more regular working hours. 0 10.7 0 3.8 0 0.024
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a decline in the growth of the public sector in coastal and rural Norway from the end of
the 1980s. However, the data on these issues do not invite strong conclusions and the
findings are suggestive only.
In summary, with regard to exit reasons, it seems that the explanation for why
fishers leave is to be found in a mix of pull factors related to welfare state developments,
expectations and competing job markets and perceptive push factors related to the working
conditions in the industry.
At the same time, as presented in Table 1, we witnessed an exceptional development
in the operating margins in the fisheries following an extended closure of the fisheries.
As mentioned earlier, the vessel groups with sound wage-paying ability (larger vessels)
also had the highest recruitment challenges. Closure and high wage-paying ability
should probably keep people in the fisheries as, for example, the increasing age in the
most profitable fisheries indicates8. High wage-paying ability and recruitment needs can
be characterised as attractors that could work as pull-back factors. On its own, this should
imply that fishers were held in fisheries and attracted to fisheries – not pushed out.
As previously mentioned, we have followed the discourse about employment and
recruitment for a long time. From this discourse, we identified 18 arguments that were
frequently presented as reasons for fishers to leave the fishing industry. In the Norwegian
debate about fisheries recruitment and exit, these arguments are expressions of the
challenges within fisheries employment policy. The former fishers were asked to answer,
on a scale, how heavily these arguments weighed in their decision to quit. The answers
reflected that, in addition to the push and pull factors in tables 3 and 4, several other
reasons may have contributed to the decision. These arguments cannot be labelled clearly
as push and pull factors; some of them could actually be seen as both, depending on how
they relate to other factors inside or outside of the fisheries. In addition, in practice, a
person can quit because of a new job on land or in the oil industry, but the deciding factor
for quitting may still be influenced by several other factors, for example perceived
physical labour conditions or a change in the family situation. The physical labour
conditions (in this case a push factor) were not strong enough alone to make the
decision, but when an interesting job became available, it made the choice easier.
Thus, the findings reported below are complementing nuances rather than contradictions
to the previous discussed findings.
The arguments consist of one group (1–5) of what we can call psychological and
physical characteristics of the job as a fisher. They relate to personal abilities, seasickness,
physical strength, and the ability to work alone. These are difficult to clearly categorise as
push or pull factors, since they are so closely linked to personal abilities. The next group
of arguments (6–10) is more closely related to structural changes in the fleet or the effects
of such changes and can be seen as push factors in the sense that they are structural fac-
tors within the fisheries that affect individual choices. To some extent they are the effects
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tions can be seen as conditions that make it more difficult to continue as fishers. The last
group of arguments (11–18) consists of factors that are related to conditions within the
fishing fleet, but the judgement of these factors is also related to broader valuations in the
society. For example, the perception of physical and social work conditions, of risk, of
acceptable work hours, leisure time and time with the family are all factors that can be
valued in relation to conditions in other businesses and trades in the welfare society. Even
if the factors we have mentioned are all related to conditions on board, their perception
can be affected by general values in the society. Fishing is a risky and physically challen-
ging job, but the willingness to accept the risks and hardships is not a fixed constant. It
depends on conditions inside and outside of the fisheries. Thus, a society’s generally low
level of willingness to accept risk may be seen as a stronger pull factor than the push
effect stemming from the perception of risk in a group of fishers. The labour conditions
and risk perception are some of the factors in group two affected by the fisheries policy
directly, though not to the same extent. In a society that does not value leisure time very
highly, for example, a fisher would probably not report that as important for quitting the
job. The results are presented in Table 6.
As we see, of the personal factors, 15% of those who left reported that their experi-
ence of the work as physically demanding and monotonous was an important reason
for leaving the fisheries. This answer is not about the physical labour conditions as
such, but more about the individual ability to master the work. In group 2, where the
factors are more related to push factors, we see that only the difficult economy was
reported to have had an effect for more than 15% of the respondents. In group 3, six
factors were reported by more than 20% of the fishers as important or very importantTable 6 Reason to quit and cohort
Importance reasons Very little Little Neither little
nor large
Large Very large Don’t know/not
relevant
1 Seasickness 91.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0
2 Too demanding physically 60.5 12.0 11.0 8.0 7.5 1.0
3 Lonely working alone 4.5 1.5 1.5 0.5 1.0 91.0
4 Work too monotonous 45.0 16.5 20.0 8.5 9.5 .5
5 Was treated badly 72.5 12.5 5.5 5.0 1.5 3.0
6 No boats left in community 79.0 7.0 4.0 2.0 5.5 2.5
7 Difficult to run a profitable
business
55.0 10.5 14.5 9.0 8.5 2.5
8 Strong certification demands 65.5 13.0 7.5 3.0 3.0 8.0
9 New technology 79.0 10.0 6.5 2.0 0.0 2.5
10 Regulations and demands 62.0 9.0 12.5 6.0 5.0 5.5
11 Bad social labour conditions 57.5 15.5 10.0 4.0 3.0 10.0
12 Physical labour conditions 46.0 15.5 16.5 13.0 8.0 1.0
13 Too risky 36.5 24.5 16.5 15.0 7.0 0.5
14 Loss of interest in fishery 46.0 15.0 15.5 11.5 11.5 .5
15 The working hours (bad times) 33.0 14.0 14.0 15.5 22.5 1.0
16 Too little leisure time 33.5 12.5 19.5 15.5 18.0 1.0
17 Too little time with family 30.0 13.5 18.0 13.5 24.0 1.0
18 Friends stopped fishing 62.5 13.0 10.0 7.5 6.0 1.0
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risky character of the job, loss of interest in fishery, perception of the working
hours as not good or inconvenient, that fishing offered too little leisure time, and
that fishers had too little time with the family. As we have said, all of these factors
can be seen as valued in relation to a more general perception of what is good
welfare and a good livelihood.
In the group of answers related to family and social life, “the working hours” (38%), “too
little time with family” (37.5%) and “too little leisure time” (33.5%) have the highest scores.
The awkward working hours, substantial working pressure in fisheries, the seasonal
patterns of the fisheries and too little time with the family and/or friends outside the fishery
can therefore be seen as the major reasons for fishers’ leaving among these factors.
So far we have looked for reasons in general. Of the 18 arguments, the arguments
related to economy, technology and formal requirements apply more to boat owners than
to the crew. Cross tabulation of factors 7, 8, 9 and 10 indicated that these mainly applied
to boat owners and not so much to the crew. It should be mentioned that the number of
boat owners in the material was low; only 30 of the 200 were boat owners. Technological
change, more regulations and other formal requirements are changes inside the sector
that are typical push factors. They can, to some extent, be compared to whether or not
being a fisher was easier or more difficult before. If the situation in the fisheries is
perceived to have become more difficult – for example, because regulations have reduced
freedom – increased regulations can be seen as a push factor. The factor “Difficult to run
a profitable business”, which applies entirely to boat owners, is more complicated to
categorise. Particularly because this is reported in a period when economic indicators give
us reasons to believe that the situation is good (Table 1), it is obvious that this factor is
not only related to internal factors in the industry. The general cost level, interest rates,
income levels and expectations in the society (Directorate of Fisheries 2000–2010b;
Johnsen 2005) may have impacted on what a boat owner regards as a profitable business.
Again, push and pull are closely related.
As mentioned above, a positive correlation connects age with leaving fisheries to take
more education. Since education seems to be mostly of interest to the younger fishers, this
may affect how the cohorts of fishers develop over time. At our request, the Directorate of
Fisheries has followed the development of the 1993 cohort. This cohort diminished on aver-
age by 11% annually from 1993 to 2007, with declines varying from up to 30% in the first
six years down to less than 1% in the last part of the period. An analysis of the material in
the Fishermen’s Pension Fund Register (Garantikassen for fiskere), carried out for a govern-
ment committee evaluating pensions and social benefits for fishers, indicated the same
pattern (Johnsen 2003). Fishers seem more likely to quit early in their careers. Traditionally,
due to seasonal patterns and opportunities for good income through hard intensive work,
fishing has been attractive for people with a short-term perspective on their careers.Discussion: push, pull and welfare considerations among fishers
Our results show that there were several reasons behind the reduction in the number
of Norwegian fishers in the period between 1990 and 2005 and these did not support
the simple hypothesis that was presented in the public debate in Norway that fishers
were mainly forced out of the fisheries. Altogether, we see that the factors we describe
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considerable impact on the former fishers’ choices. This is quite consistent with the
impression we gained by interviewing people in fishing communities: we rarely meet
people who actually claim that they have been directly forced out of the fisheries.
As illustrated in Table 1, the economic situation in the fishing fleet has improved since
the 1990s, and the fleet’s wage-paying ability has increased. Thus, as our findings also indi-
cate, poor vessel economy cannot be seen as an overall reason for leaving in the period we
have studied. This is supported by the findings in a quantitative study of recruitment from
2007 that indicate that the fishing fleets in general have had few recruitment problems in
the period (Sønvisen et al. 2011). However, some vessels and vessel groups reported in this
study that they have had some problems recruiting. In the study, 20% of owners of vessels
between 15 and 21 m and conventional vessels larger than 28 m answered that they have
experienced recruitment problems (Johnsen and Vik 2008; Sønvisen et al. 2011). According
to the economic surveys in the fishing fleet, these two vessel groups have had a substantial
increase in their operating margin9 and “wage-paying ability”. Recruitment problems in a
situation when positions are open for new fishers, and with increasing wage-paying ability,
point towards a pull more than a push. In such a situation, neither low profitability nor
closure can be seen as the main causes for leaving the fishing fleet. Since 2007, the use of
migrant labour seems to have increased in the fisheries, particularly in the vessel groups
where indications of recruitment problems were found10. Obviously, the reasons for leaving
the fisheries are more diverse and cannot be seen as an effect of only a few factors.
On the other hand, our findings cannot be interpreted as claiming that non-
discretionary push factors are irrelevant, though they are not the only important reasons
for people leaving the fisheries. The push and pull factors must be seen in relation to each
other. Furthermore, they must be seen in relation to, and as indications of, the changing
character of fishery networks. From our point of view, the reasons to quit are complex.
As we have argued, both the fishery-specific networks and the networks that involve
coastal communities and larger welfare state factors have changed. As Sønvisen et al.
(2011) pointed out, the employment systems for the fishing fleet have become more
specialised and less embedded in the communities. Parallel to this development, people in
coastal communities now have many other work opportunities. A policy directed toward
downsizing the fisheries sector may be perceived by some as a push to explore alternative
employment opportunities, even if jobs are available in the fisheries. The material we have
studied suggests that welfare state development has impacted on why people choose to
leave the fisheries. These factors are expressed mostly as an emphasis on social factors
such as time with family, leisure time and more regular work hours. The increased use of
foreign labour may indicate that the pull from the welfare society is strong.
Clearly, though, the reasons for leaving the fisheries are heterogeneous. Even if the
factors can be grouped as pull and push factors, they are probably more related to each
other than the results show. The effect of pull factors might actually make push factors
appear stronger than they are.The disciplining welfare state as a transformative force
Our results point toward the strong transformative forces in the welfare society that
contribute to pulling everyone toward a more regulated life, surrounded by a
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all about.
Before we turn to our final thoughts about the fisheries, we will add a methodological
remark. This study has illustrated the value of combining methods and approaches.
The mixed approach and methodology have helped us to see that the changes we have
studied are not caused by one factor or a few clear factors endogenous to our own
study set-up. Instead we see that several factors work together and strengthen and
weaken each other. This is particularly important for studies of sectorial change within
a welfare state context. General increases in living standards change the perception of
welfare in a sector that develops differently for different reasons. Often it is not possible
to point to one or a few single causes because several factors have indirect effects, not
through direct regulation but through symbolic or mental impact on perceptions and
values. Furthermore, the disciplining effects from the many welfare state instruments
and devices that structure and rationalise all kind of activities train us to be welfare
state citizens, almost in the same way as the former fisheries employment systems
attached people and households to fishing as a way of life. None of these welfare state
“dispositifs”, to use a Foucaultian term, work through external push and pull factors
but assemble the factors together, internalise and combine them in ways that make
them even more powerful. Fishers’ exit is not the effect of one or a few factors but an
accumulation of effects of the relationships between many factors – within and outside
the world of fisheries. You can beat a fishing regulation and choose to stay inside the
fisheries even if the regulation makes your life more difficult. But when the regulation
is introduced at the same time as you need a new chart plotter, when you have a strict
repayment scheme for your mortgage and boat loan, a requirement to be present at a
parents’ meeting at school, an expectation about planned holidays and involvement in
your kids’ sports activities, alternatives to fishing may become more attractive.
Fishing is still the last pre-modern hunting activity in the modern society, while the
rest of the population live rather stable lives with secure incomes. The last hunters
probably feel the pull from their families and society to a more secure and stable life.
Stability, safety and security for the fishers have been among the rationales behind the
attempts to transform the fishing fleet from a seasonal and unstable activity to a more
predictable harvest activity as we have described. Resource management, together with
technological, managerial and organisational development, have been the main tools
for this transformation (Bavington 2009; Holm 2001; Johnsen 2005; Johnsen et al.
2009a). In spite of the radical changes we have described, the organisation of the fishe-
ries still makes it more difficult for fishers to have what we today regard as a normal
on-shore life. Some of the instability in terms of irregular working hours, periods away
from home and changing income is almost impossible to change. A couple of decades
ago, fishing families represented a majority in fishing communities, and the organisa-
tion of the fisheries impacted on the organisation of society. In the attempts to
modernise and professionalise the fisheries, the focus has been on fishers’ social security,
job protection, pension rights and reduction of instability. Because of this process, in
combination with the rural development policy in Norway that has contributed to more
job opportunities outside fishing, the attachment to fishing as a way of life may have been
weakened both for fishers and for their families. This is reflected in the concept of
disembedding that we described earlier in this article. Today these families are a minority
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communities. Some might see the organic organisation of the fisheries in the past
as the ideal, but the practice of such anti-modernism will require fishers to break
with the welfare society to a large extent.
Instead we will point in another direction. We believe that fishers should have the
same rights and opportunities as others. However, they have to accept that some aspects of
their job make it special. We do not believe that the development toward more cybernetic
organisations and harvest machines will be reversed, but it is important that they are under-
stood as tools, not only for increased efficiency, but also for improving people’s lives.
Certainly, developing cybernetic harvest machines is not a goal in itself. The results from
this article give us reason to claim that fisheries have to develop in concert with the
surrounding society. One set of implications from our results is that the work conditions on
board must be excellent and the job has to be safe. Moreover, the fisheries must be profit-
able enough to compensate for drawbacks and inconveniences related to fishing. One solu-
tion is, of course, related to the use of more than one crew and a regular shift system as
many vessels have today. The shift system contributes to more time off and makes it
possible for the fisher and the family to plan their everyday life. In addition, the opportunity
to work intensively over certain periods with long periods off could give considerable
freedom to those who can adapt to such a lifestyle. These conditions must be competitive if
they are to work as pull-back factors. However, as we have already mentioned, closed access
makes it more difficult to return. On the other hand, keeping a part of the sector open, both
in terms of access and in terms of reasonable capital requirements and income opportu-
nities, can be important. Through this opening, committed people can find a way into the
fisheries, for longer or shorter periods. The knowledge they acquire can represent an
important asset if recruitment to the closed segment of the fleet stops. Such an opening is
also one of the very few self-employment opportunities in coastal Norway.
In relation to the definition of employment and recruitment policy for the fisheries sector
in the future, single-factor incitements to motivate people to become fishers or to remain
fishers may not work. As our study has illustrated, the effects are caused by the relationship
between several factors. Since the fisheries have become more and more affected by and
integrated into on-shore society, the sector policy approach is about to become too narrow.
Therefore, a closer integration between sector policies, educational policy, labour market
policy, coastal community policy and welfare policy is needed. The challenges in front of
us are not sector challenges but challenges for coastal communities and the wider society,
in Norway as well as in other coastal regions.Endnotes
1 The closed group is very diverse, from 11 m coastal vessels to large factory trawlers,
purse seiners and autoliners. Different measures apply to the vessels depending on
length, fishery and gear type. We do not go into details about this.
2 We have borrowed concepts from Bourdieu (1986, 1983) to express the difference
between a material and cultural field or domain. Inside the frame of this article we do not
go deeper into these concepts.
3 Here we can mention the most recent: “Seminar about Right Based Fisheries in the
North Atlantic”. Nordic Council of Ministers, Tórshavn, Faroe Islands. 10 June 2010.
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http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/12/1/4Workshop on Longlinging, Reykjavik, Iceland, 19–20 Oct. 2010. General Assembly,
Norwegian Fishing Vessel Owners Association, Oslo 2–3 February 2011. Norwegian
Conference on Longlining, Måløy, Norway, 29–30 March 2011.
4 The literature quoted in this section is a selection of the literature produced
throughout this period.
5 There are striking similarities between, for example, Norway and Newfoundland
where sector policies, rural policy and social policy were oriented towards modern-
isation in terms of focus on stabilisation of natural or market fluctuations, stable
employment and increased and stable wages, access to education and public ser-
vices, and social benefits, like pension and unemployment wages. In addition, sup-
port was given for resettlement from remote communities (see Neis 1999; Wadel
1986; Finstad 2005). In some of the communities along the coast of Finnmark, the
consequences of the cod crisis in 1989 for the households were mitigated by the
women’s increased labour activity in other sectors. During the cod crisis in Norway
the unemployment rate was higher for men than for women, which actually illus-
trates that the dependency on fish was reduced because women had found other
job opportunities (Mariussen, et al. 1990).
6 See figure five in Gullestad (2004):5.
7 Work contracts are common today; the wage is still based on a share of the
catch, but the fishers have the right to get paid regularly and not only at the end
of the season. In recent years, the use of immigrant labour has increased in the
fishing fleet, and the effects of this development have not been studied yet.
8 In the purse seining fleet in Norway it has been regarded as a problem that due to
the high salaries and the short seasons nobody left their positions before they actually
had to quit because of age or health (Johnsen 2004).
9 Operating margin = result ×100/operating revenues.
10 The issue was raised under the Norwegian Conference at Longlining, Måløy,
Norway, March 29–30, 2011. We also discussed the issue with boat owners, crew and
former owners and crew during the conference.
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